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The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 in the history of 
cosmopolitanism
Samuel Moyn 
In the course of 1948, debates around the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, to be ratified by the United Nations 
General Assembly in December of that year, gained some traction 
in European public consciousness1.1 This essay originated as a 
lecture in both the “Around 1948” and “International Women’s 
Human Rights” Sawyer Seminars at the University of Chicago on 
November 29, 2011, and the text sticks close to the original format. 
I am grateful to Christine Stansell and Linda M.G. Zerilli for the 
invitation and to the members of the audiences at the lecture as 
well as the seminars that followed. I would also like to thank Leela 
Gandhi and Deborah Nelson who improved the text, and Todd 
Shepard and others at a session of the Johns Hopkins University 
Political and Moral Thought Seminar who forced significant 
changes.  
1 This essay originated as a lecture in both the “Around 1948” and “International 
Women’s Human Rights” Sawyer Seminars at the University of Chicago on 
November 29, 2011, and the text sticks close to the original format. I am 
grateful to Christine Stansell and Linda M.G. Zerilli for the invitation and to the 
members of the audiences at the lecture as well as the seminars that followed. I 
would also like to thank Leela Gandhi and Deborah Nelson who improved the 
text, and Todd Shepard and others at a session of the Johns Hopkins University 
Political and Moral Thought Seminar who forced significant changes.  
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When revising an essay for its inclusion in The Discovery 
of the Mind (one of the most celebrated books of the mid-century 
humanities across the Atlantic world), Snell added the following 
remarkable passage: “Euripides, in his Medea, is the first to 
portray a human being who excites pity by the mere fact of being 
a human being in torment. [A]s a barbarian she has no rights, but 
as a human being she has. This same Medea is also the first person 
in literature whose thinking and feeling are described in purely 
human terms. … No sooner does man declare his independence 
of the gods, than he acclaims the authority of the free human spirit 
and the inviolability of human rights”2.
To say that the Medea is a parable about human rights, 
simply because it dramatizes the pitiable fate of a foreigner under 
the sway of local prejudice, is a rather remarkable assertion of 
course. Yet Snell’s interpretation of this moment in the classical 
past remains exemplary – and not only in its now commonplace 
linkage of suffering, pity, individuality, and rights. For more 
basically, it starts out with a model of singular cosmopolitan 
breakthrough, which continues to pervade the contemporary 
historiography of human rights. 
Since Snell’s time, to be sure, few have made anything 
of Euripides. More often, they have credited the Stoics for the 
invention of humanity thanks to that philosophical movement’s 
2 Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European 
Thought, trans. T.G. Rosenmeyer (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 250. The essay 
was added to the second German edition of the book, which is the basis 
for the English translation cited here. The introduction of the present essay 
summarizes another piece of mine, which then goes more deeply into alternative 
cosmopolitanisms, while this one applies those lessons to 1948 as a significant 
moment in the history of these cosmopolitanisms. See Samuel Moyn, “Plural 
Cosmopolitanisms and the Origins of Human Rights,” in Costas Douzinas, ed., 
The Meanings of Human Rights (Cambridge, forthcoming). See also earlier 
my The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass., 2010).   
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discovery, in the tracks of Diogenes the Cynic, of the “cosmopolis” 
or community of all human beings. The model is one of insight 
beyond the boundaries of family, tribe, or nation; and after 
the Stoics, medieval spirituality, Scholastic natural law, the 
Renaissance, William Shakespeare, and (of course) Immanuel Kant 
have also earned admiration for this selfsame breakthrough3. In the 
end, however else most accounts of the emergence of human rights 
may differ, 1948 is the most uplifting moment – though the point 
of such narratives of breakthrough is that there is a last leg in a 
kind of moral relay race for cosmopolitanism’s heirs to run today4. 
This approach makes the history of modern human rights 
generally, and the 1948 achievement of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in particular, valuable to study and for a crucial 
reason. It casts them as the near conclusion and culmination of the 
epoch-making emergence of cosmopolitanism, defined – as Snell 
did in his reading of Euripides – as the universalistic inclusion of 
all humanity in the set of morally relevant subjects of political 
concern and action. Yet conceptualizing the aspiration to human 
unity as a singular achievement turns out to be deeply implausible; 
and if so, then shifting how to conceive of universalism in history 
entirely alters the questions to pose to and about the Universal 
Declaration. It might even suggest that the barrage of recent 
attention to human rights in 1948 is misplaced (including in this 
dossier, illuminatingly but also perhaps symptomatically). 
3 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York, 2007) famously 
offers the same scheme of suffering, pity, individuals, and rights but locates 
the breakthrough in the Enlightenment; see also now Kate Tunstall, ed., Self-
Evident Truths?: Human Rights and the Enlightenment (New York, 2012).  
4 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (New York, 2001); see also, e.g., Elizabeth 
Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2007), or more recently Akira Iriye et al., eds., The Human 
Rights Revolution: An International History (New York, 2012).  
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On reflection, the model of singular breakthrough shared by 
Snell and contemporary historiography is deeply unpersuasive, 
in part because there have been so many different candidates 
for when exactly the cosmopolitan insight occurred. What if 
cosmopolitanism was easy to achieve historically? Is the genuine 
difficulty that localist and otherwise parochial moralities have 
predominated, given that universalist moral visions litter the 
annals, the victims not solely of narcissistic particularisms but also 
of their own bitter contention? While skepticism of various claims 
to transcend moral parochialism – Christianity’s over Judaism, for 
instance, or communism’s over capitalism – has proved simple, 
the most provocative consequence of this skepticism has never 
been drawn in the widespread debate among scholars and in public 
about where human rights came from. It is that cosmopolitanism 
is best studied not in the singular but in the plural. As Sheldon 
Pollock has arrestingly contended: “There has been not just one 
cosmopolitanism in history but several”5.
Pollock’s general proposition seems simple, but it has a 
number of decisive ramifications, besides forcing the rejection of 
the notion of singular breakthrough. If it is correct, Michel Foucault 
was wrong that humanity is an invention of recent date; far more 
important was the variety of claims on its basis, and perhaps 
from the beginning of human culture. Similarly, Carl Schmitt 
was mistaken that those who have always invoked humanity have 
always lied, concealing particular interests, for the condition of 
cosmopolitan aspiration turns out to be its articulation in some 
5 Sheldon Pollock, The Languages of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, 
Culture, and Power in Premodern India (Berkeley, 2006), 280. See also Carol A. 
Breckinridge et al., eds., Cosmopolitanism (Raleigh, 2002), in which Pollock’s 
chapter provides a brief overview of his theses. Compare Lydia Liu’s essay 
in this dossier for a model of understanding human rights in the 1940s that 
fruitfully remains oriented around universalism and particularism.   
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particular version. Put differently, cosmopolitanism is not just a 
cheat or smokescreen but what makes the specific program that 
it harbors ideologically appealing (something that Karl Marx, 
in opposing bourgeois universalism with another kind, well 
understood). 
Arguably, then, cosmopolitanism not only comes in the plural, 
but articulations of it have teemed all along, indeed struggled with 
one another vigorously. And indeed they have done so in the heart 
of the tradition of “the West” – a point for which Pollock’s insight 
needs to be adapted since he developed it through a comparison 
of different antique civilizations. Any story of cosmopolitanism 
anywhere, if Pollock is right, needs to be as much about the 
conflict of ideologies as much as about the breakthrough to one; 
and if this insight is helpful for understanding history long ago, it 
is even more decisive a tool for conceptualizing it very recently. 
As late as the Cold War already on in 1948, which was a battle to 
the death of rival cosmopolitanisms, “humanity” was crucial, but 
only in different articulations aiming to supplement or to displace 
one another. 1948 is, in short, not the turning point in the path of 
a singular cosmopolitanism but the scene of struggle between 
different kinds – a struggle in which the appeal to and of human 
rights was actually very minor.
*
That there was not just one cosmopolitanism in 1948 but 
several – and that the Universal Declaration’s lonely version may 
have been marginal to their contention – is not the usual framework 
in thinking about the document, which is usually chronicled and 
celebrated simply for its emergence. This exclusionary focus on 
the making and content of the Universal Declaration has taught 
us a great deal, no doubt, but solely about diplomatic origins; it 
is, overwhelmingly, a story of a small number of elites, working 
in the interstices of a fledgling and problematic international 
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organization6. Beyond those severe limits it has had several quite 
unfortunate drawbacks. It has overly made the story of diplomatic 
penmanship overly dramatic (indeed melodramatic), though 
when it came to the document’s content, in spite of a few modest 
squabbles, nearly everyone agreed about it, including both sides 
of what would become the Cold War rift. But most basically, 
the historiography failed to ask whether anyone cared about the 
Universal Declaration at the time – and if not why not. 
The truth is that, in real time, the nation-state exiting patriotic 
war won as a political form, and nationalism won as a political 
ideology, though this claim needs to be specified from several 
different angles. Above all, I will contend that the national welfarist 
consensus is the far more significant feature of 1948 than the 
Universal Declaration – and indeed that “human rights,” to the 
extent they were significant at all, became one more and rather 
infrequent synonym for this consensus. This conclusion is then 
possible to test by looking to those few Western Europeans who 
were in the 1940s the only forces anywhere who simultaneously 
gave refuge to supranational human rights, seeking a supplementary 
vessel for cosmopolitanism beyond their nation-states reconstituted 
around a welfarist ideal. Even that commitment to human rights 
quickly merged into another term for shelter under America’s 
Cold War wing – though it bore unexpected fruit much later in 
contemporary European human rights culture. Both the American 
and Soviet side were to fight the Cold War in cosmopolitan terms 
or as ultimately humanistic struggle with (where necessary) 
humanistic violence, and no international human rights movement 
emerged immediately. All of these cosmopolitan solutions, from 
6 See, e.g., Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
Origins, Drafting, and Intent (Philadelphia, 2000) or more recently William 
Schabas, ed., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Travaux 
Préparatoires, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 2013).   
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nationalism to Cold War supranationalism, would have to enter 
crisis for a global ethic of human rights in our contemporary sense 
to achieve the salience it now has7.
I realize some may bridle at my suggestion that nationhood 
and nationalism are cosmopolitan; yet they have been a much 
more immediately obvious, practically transformative, and likely 
effective version of cosmopolitanism in world history – certainly 
more so than international human rights politics so far. Nationalism 
not only sought to reach individual protection through collective 
emancipation, but it also started from the premise that collective 
subjects – larger than the individual though smaller than all 
humankind – equally deserved the power to determine their own 
fate. The rights of man had been the fruit of the French Revolution, 
but what they meant for Europe in the nineteenth century was 
primarily the birth of nationalist movements. Historians have 
attempted to look for equivalents to Amnesty International in 
the era, starting with the antislavery international; it is not so 
much that they are wrong as that their preconceptions make 
them unable to see that the primary legacy of the rights of man 
was the mobilizational search for the revolutionary nation-state 
that “human rights” now seem principally about containing and 
subordinating to higher law. One of the major reasons the reference 
to universality and nature waned so significantly in the nineteenth 
century was the general conclusion that the invocation of man 
and nature led or even amounted to the local task of constructing 
citizenship spaces through particular struggles for collective 
freedom and then for the meaning of citizenship.
7 Moyn, The Last Utopia, chap. 4. The battle over which side in the Cold War 
could claim that its violence served humanity is already presaged and analyzed 
in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanisme et terreur, essai sur le problème 
communiste (Paris, 1947), translated by John O’Neill as Humanism and Terror: 
An Essay on the Communist Problem (Boston, 1969).   
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Appeal to transcendent rights may well have stimulated the 
project of revolutionary founding or refounding, starting with John 
Locke and his settler heirs in what became the United States and 
running through modern transatlantic and indeed global history. 
But when different sides of local politics appealed to them as 
a basis for revising citizenship, their uselessness became plain. 
For it soon became clear that what mattered more was not the 
prepolitical appeal the contending sides in politics could make 
to nature to support its interpretation of citizenship, but rather 
who won the political struggle and the mandate to pass laws in 
the service of that interpretation8. Hannah Arendt was probably 
mistaken, in On Revolution, in her belief that that natural rights 
were a useless distraction from the project of founding modern 
nation-states; but she was undoubtedly correct that our nineteenth-
century ancestors found natural rights unhelpful in adjudicating 
their contending visions of citizenship within those political 
communities. As she accurately put it in her celebrated analysis 
in The Origins of Totalitarianism, the rights of man were “treated 
as a sort of stepchild by nineteenth-century political thought and 
… no liberal or radical party in the twentieth century … saw fit to 
include them in its program. … If the laws of their country did not 
live up to the demands of the Rights of Man, they were expected to 
change them, by legislation … or through revolutionary action”9.
For all that rights were shunned on the basis of nineteenth 
century learning, it is nonetheless true that cosmopolitan 
8 For a classic exposition, see Marcel Gauchet, “Les droits de l’homme ne sont 
pas une politique,” Le Débat 3 (July–August 1980), rpt. in Gauchet, La condition 
politique (Paris, 2005).   
9 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 3rd ed. (New York, 1968), 293. 
For some relevant citations showing Arendt long connected rights and religion, 
and disavowed them both for the sake of secular politics, see my “Hannah 
Arendt on the Secular,” New German Critique 105 (Fall 2008): 71-96.
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aspirations remained important through nationalism, understood 
as the liberation of peoples usually thought to entail individual 
protection. The so-called “springtime of nations” in 1848 is 
emblematic here. The universalistic premise of nationalism that 
all peoples should determine their own fate seems to have been 
the most appealing cosmopolitanism throughout modern history, 
and that is perhaps because while collective emancipation could 
afford individual protection, the reverse was not obviously true. 
Movements like the civil liberties movements that emerged at the 
turn of the twentieth century or the interwar vogue of proclaiming 
rights in the constitutions of new nation-states are definitely worth 
noting, as long as it is clear that these did not aim at or give rise to 
significant movements to place rights above nation-state.
In diplomatic relations, in fact, the origins of the United 
Nations, one of whose very minor byproducts was the drafting of 
the Universal Declaration, conceded the sovereignty of nations 
far more fundamentally than the prior experiment at international 
organization of the interwar years. What is remarkable is how 
little the version of cosmopolitanism known as international 
human rights, notably compared with the Christian and imperial 
cosmopolitanisms of prior centuries which so easily authorized 
intervention and expansion in the international system, was 
allowed to qualify national sovereignty in the 1940s. The UN 
Charter makes this fact utterly clear, permitting the use of force 
only for the sake of security or peace in its text (and for the sake of 
humanity or justice only in our own day and through interpretative 
departure from its terms). The dismaying truth may be that no 
sooner had human rights become an available diplomatic moral 
cosmopolitanism, than the international system became one based 
more thoroughly on impregnable sovereignty than before. As Mark 
Mazower has emphasized, internationalism has a long history, and 
its contending versions mattered as much in 1948 as at any other 
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time. But not only is internationalism (itself with plural forms in 
contention) merely one form of cosmopolitanism, knitting the 
nations it presupposes together. For the supplement it provided 
diplomatically to the victory of the nation-state in the 1940s was 
actually then – and may remain – relatively minor. Put another 
way, Giuseppe Mazzini’s nationalist legacy by far predominated 
in 1948 over his internationalist complement10. But since I have 
emphasized this diplomatic point so much in a recent book that 
covers how human rights became eligible through the UN’s 
wartime formation to be declared in 1948 at all, I would much 
rather focus on other matters11.
The fact is that it still remains to ask why citizens followed 
their politicians – ignoring the minor bit of lip service the latter 
gave in the 1940s to international human rights – in opting 
massively and wholeheartedly for some defensible version of 
national welfarism. Citizens did so enthusiastically because their 
nation-states were making unprecedented promises that were 
simply much more exciting than any attempt to guarantee human 
rights above the nation. Welfarism reached its height, and therefore 
across the North Atlantic the state empowered in wartime reached 
the height of its peacetime functionality in history so far, precisely 
beginning in the 1940s when various commitments to welfarism 
were shouldered across the zone of industrial democracy, including 
across lands that became communist. The salient question was not 
whether welfarism, but which kind, and how much, resolutely 
within the national framework. As Gunnar Myrdal pithily 
10 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York, 2012), 
which casts Mazzini as godfather of contemporary liberal internationalism, 
alongside Karl Marx’s competing internationalism, which was likewise still 
prominent in 1948.   
11 Moyn, The Last Utopia, chap. 2.   
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explained, looking back at this extraordinary consensus, “the 
welfare state is nationalistic”12. 
The Universal Declaration’s cosmopolitanism needs to be 
placed back in this atmosphere, where the general conclusion 
from World War II was that economic disaster underlay military 
conflict, and guaranteeing freedom from want would prove the 
key to securing freedom from fear. Probably most people who 
heard of the Universal Declaration and its idea of human rights 
understood it as what it announces itself to be, a “common standard 
of achievement for all peoples and nations,” in which social and 
economic rights figured fully13. Put differently, it was a template 
for national welfarism. For most of those few who noticed the 
document at all, it was a kind of checklist for all nations to consult, 
in particular in making welfarist protection the highest promise of 
collective politics. But to say so is also to acknowledge that such 
promises were more readily available already locally, and were 
in fact the object of old and new struggles by 1948. 
There are three important implications of this fact for 
assessing the true relevance (or more accurately, comparative 
unimportance) of the Universal Declaration in 1948. For one thing, 
the main substance of many of the oldest of those struggles had 
long since marginalized individual rights as the proper language for 
achieving welfare. Briefly put, the world seemed to have learned 
by the 1940s that you certainly could talk about welfarism outside 
the paradigm of individual rights, and you might need to do so. 
12 Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning in the Welfare 
States and Its Internationalist Implications (London, 1960), 117. Consider what 
would happen if the approach of James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II 
Americans and the Age of Big Government (New York, 2011) were generalized 
to the entirety of the North Atlantic industrial zone.  
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 
at 71 (1948).   
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Obviously anyone who read Karl Marx (and there were a lot more 
fitting that description in the 1940s than now) suspected as much. 
But we have perhaps forgotten that the fiftyyear history of the fight 
for welfare before 1948 where capitalism remained the horizon 
of politics – as in the Anglo-American sphere – was very often a 
struggle against natural rights, in philosophy and in courts, where 
they had been primarily deployed to protect the inviolability of 
contractual freedom and private property. By the postwar moment, 
in fact, the debate around which sort of welfare to have was never 
or hardly ever intellectually organized around a cleavage between 
those supporting and those rejecting rights in the abstract. It is now 
popular to conceive of modern history as a forum of expanding 
rights claims or “rights cascades.” The difficulty with this scheme 
is that it cannot see that most progressive political positions, not 
least the campaign for welfare, endorsed the language of rights 
rarely and strategically. Philosophically, liberalism itself hardly 
flirted with the ideological priority of rights between the 1790s 
and the 1970s. 
Second and inversely, therefore, national welfarism had a 
massive number of other idioms in which to proceed to frame its 
agenda, and in general succeeded under those alternative banners. 
Whether in the name of the common good or social solidarity or 
the general welfare, social protection most often got however far 
it did from place to place outside the paradigm of rights, especially 
individual rights. There are obviously exceptions to this statement, 
such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s evanescent proposal of a 
Second Bill of Rights in 1944 or even the International Labour 
Organization’s Philadelphia declaration the same year14. But 
14 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution 
and Why We Need It More Than Ever (New York, 2006); Alain Supiot, The 
Spirit of Philadelphia: Social Justice versus the Total Market (New York, 2012). 
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one may not overstate the prominence, or persistence, of these 
framings either. It would be a serious mistake, then, to imply that 
the progress of welfarism between the 1930s and the 1950s in any 
way depended on the ideological ascendancy of rights talk – even 
the introduction of social rights. 
And third and most important, the Universal Declaration 
by the late date of its passage simply offered no new tools to 
or for various national struggles to promote welfarism in some 
form. Because historians have focused on the emergence of the 
Universal Declaration they have not even looked for evidence 
that that process made a practical difference in debates around 
social citizenship and so far as I know there is no such evidence. If 
anything, it was rearguard because it preserved a memory of fuller 
wartime consensus around welfare than obtained just a few years 
later when national politics had already been reframed around the 
still familiar sides arguing for more or less welfare. It was ignored, 
most probably, because its belated fiction of consensus clashed 
so vividly with the realities of domestic infighting. The stark fact 
is that the Universal Declaration has proved far more useful to 
ourselves than to those living in its time. No one has asked why, 
though it is the right quandary to solve both to understand our 
ancestors and ourselves. 
*
What of the Holocaust? It is an essential concern because 
of the now deeply ingrained assumption that the entire aftermath 
of the World War II, and the Universal Declaration not least, just 
must have been a response to the Jewish genocide. But contrary 
to a generally shared opinion, a cosmopolitan morality based on 
our memory of what has become the emblematic state atrocity 
did not emerge in the 1940s, and at the risk of offending current 
pieties one might suggest that there were good reasons and not 
simply bad faith that determined this result. 
278
SamUel moyn
Meritum – Belo Horizonte – v. 10 – n. 2 – p. 265-291 – jul./dez. 2015
The Universal Declaration does indeed refer to the “disregard 
and contempt for human rights [that] have resulted in barbarous 
acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind.” This meant 
that every nation had its horrors, since the Nazis did many terrible 
things. The most famous outrages on humanity of the 1940s were 
Leningrad and Lidice not Belzec or Treblinka. In any event, for 
practically no one and for few Jews was the Holocaust, to the extent 
its enormity was understood at all, the rationale for suprastate 
law. From the pillars of postwar legalization like the Nuremberg 
principles, the genocide convention, and the Geneva Conventions, 
the Universal Declaration stands essentially apart, otherwise 
unconcerned with wartime violence, shunning international law, 
and reposing hopes for welfare in national self-assertion. The much 
more popular internationalist response to the Holocaust as such 
probably occurred in Eastern Europe as antifascism; and for Jews 
outside the now depopulated “bloodlands,” allegiances were won 
essentially by nationalism at home in the form of integration or 
abroad in the form of often novel Zionist commitments.
In their cosmopolitanism centered on national welfarism (or 
outright socialism), however, Jews were fully in conformity with 
their times15. In United Nations records it seems that no one – the 
one possible exception is the likely author of that line, French Jew 
  
15 This development was once obvious even to those critical of it. Consider Isaac 
Deutscher: “The world has compelled the Jew to embrace the nation-state and to 
make of it his pride and his hope just at a time when there is little or no hope left 
in it. You cannot blame the Jews for this; you must blame the world. … [Jews] 
did not benefit from the advantages of the nation-state in those centuries when 
it was a medium of mankind’s advance and a great revolutionary and unifying 
factor in history. … I hope, therefore, that together with other nations, the Jews 
will ultimately become aware – or regain the awareness – of the inadequacy of 
the nation-state.” Isaac Deutscher, “The Non-Jewish Jew,” in The Non-Jewish 
Jew and Other Essays, ed. Tamara Deutscher (London, 1968), 41, and Ariella 
Azoulay’s essay in this dossier.   
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René Cassin – had what is now known as the Holocaust of European 
Jewry in mind in the preambular reference to barbarous acts16. At 
least, no diplomats from anywhere mentioned the Holocaust during 
the yearlong debate around the Universal Declaration. There are a 
number of not very creditable reasons for this surprising finding. But 
one creditable reason – a reason that many Jews at the time actually 
shared – is that it seemed important to put the past behind or to dwell 
on it, unlike us, as motivation for a welfarist or otherwise solidaristic 
alternative to the horrors of aggressive war. (To a remarkable extent, 
in spite of our memory of them as atrocity tribunals, the Nuremberg 
trials were also primarily about what would happen when bad actors 
ruined interstate coexistence, given the overwhelming priority given 
to the stigmatization of aggressive war in the proceedings, especially 
by American and Soviet politicians and prosecutors.)17 
Because of the national welfarist consensus that human rights 
were one way to denominate in wartime, and by the time of the 
Universal Declaration one way to recall as that consensus declined, 
humanity in the 1940s seems to have rejected much interest in the 
past in order to insist emphatically on creating a common future. 
Criminalizing atrocity had not yet become humanity’s fondest 
hope. If the Universal Declaration was a response to experience, it 
was essentially one of depression and war, not really one of atrocity 
and genocide, and for the sake of a rapid pivot to building the 
future. This is the best reason that our ancestors so quickly chose 
to skirt the difficult knowledge about who exactly had suffered in 
the past, distant but also recent, and who had suffered more or most. 
16 See now Marco Duranti, “The Holocaust, the Legacy of 1789 and the Birth of 
International Human Rights Law: Revisiting the Foundation Myth,” Journal 
of Genocide Research 14, no. 2 (2012): 159-186.   
17 Francine Hirsch, “The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, 
and the Making of the Postwar Order,” The American Historical Review 113, 
no. 3 (June 2008), 701-730.   
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*
That the 1940s were the great age of the nation-state, and 
not human rights, is most graphically reinforced by developments 
in the world of imperial politics. Actually those living under 
imperial rule had even deeper reasons to skirt international 
human rights in favor of other cosmopolitanisms. Above all, 
they had learned through mimicry as well as through the prior 
history of international politics that collective selfdetermination 
was the formal universalism to choose to advocate, especially if 
individual protection was at stake. Anticolonialism, thus, had long 
since signed on to the rights of man movements of the French 
Revolution’s aftermath, and much new research suggests that it 
was Mazzini, long before the catalytic effect of twentieth-century 
politicians like V.I. Lenin and Woodrow Wilson, who lit the fire 
of anticolonial nationalism around the world, with enthusiastic 
responses stimulated by the catalyst of festering grievance, and 
undergirded by local and often collectivist ethical sources18. But 
there was a far more short-term and unpalatable set of reasons why 
anticolonialism in the 1940s, kicking off the process of globalizing 
national welfarism under the auspices of state sovereignty, did not 
find international human rights compelling.
The chief one, obviously, was that during World War II the 
first promise the Allies seemed to make in their vision for the 
globe was one of emancipated peoples, before the Allies took that 
promise back. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 affirmed “respect [for] 
the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under 
which they will live; [with] sovereign rights and self government 
restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” But 
18 See e.g. C.A. Bayly and Eugene Biagini, eds., Giuseppe Mazzini and the 
Globalisation of Democratic Nationalism, 1830-1920 (Oxford, 2008).  
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Winston Churchill assumed it was obvious this promise applied 
to Adolf Hitler’s empire, not empire in general, and certainly not 
his empire. Roosevelt came around to this view by the time of his 
death – precisely the years during which human rights made what 
little headway they did in the North Atlantic world as a possible 
synonym for welfarism. 
According to historians of places across the world, the 
Atlantic Charter’s promise of self-determination incited a huge 
amount of enthusiasm. Amazingly, the historiography of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, simply assuming its 
monumental impact, assumes it globally, but there is little evidence 
of it. The real politics of the moment were, however, registered by 
those who have since often been thought to be confused votaries of 
cultural relativism: American anthropologists. It is just as plausible 
to view them as insisting on the prior, and perhaps better, form of 
cosmopolitanism the Allies had once offered, since they closed 
their famous 1947 statement condemning human rights with the 
following words: “The world-wide acclaim accorded the Atlantic 
Charter, before its restricted applicability was announced, is 
evidence of the fact that freedom is understood and sought after 
by peoples having the most diverse cultures”19. Far from being 
full-blown cultural relativists, the anthropologists understood 
themselves to be speaking for a cosmopolitanism that competed 
with human rights – and was displaced by them20. In geopolitical 
terms the replacement of self-determination by human rights, as an 
19 Executive Board, American Anthropological Association, “Statement on Human 
Rights,” American Anthropologist, n.s., 49, no. 4 (October-December 1947), 
539-543.  
20 This crucial point is frequently missed by anthropologists following the 
history of their discipline; compare Mark Goodale, Surrendering to Utopia: An 
Anthropology of Human Rights (Stanford, 2009). See also Liu’s discussion of 
the statement in this dossier.  
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instance of the competitive rivalry of cosmopolitanisms, remains 
one of the most fateful turning points in modern history.
Admittedly, the fact that the text of the Universal Declaration 
did not include collective self-determination may have been a 
minor failure, since the Universal Declaration, while abstaining 
from condemning empire, was not really intended to interfere 
with the nation-state. And the situation was eventually corrected 
as selfdetermination became the first human right in legal 
covenants brought about by decolonization decades later. But 
this crucial series of events does help explain why decolonization 
came to proceed based not on global human rights ideas but the 
collectivist sovereignty of the nation-state, since taken to the 
ends of the earth21. The 1940s founding of India and Pakistan 
(and Israel) set the terms for what followed, in the tradition of 
revolutionary nationalism, and far more people paid far more 
attention to these events, especially if they found themselves under 
the reconsolidating empires of the era.
A zealous criticism of teleological histories of human rights 
should not, of course, mean uncritically accepting teleological 
histories of nationalism and the nation-state. In fact, a significant 
movement in contemporary scholarship contends that in 1945 or even 
1948 the triumph of the nation-state as the normative political form 
21 See Moyn, The Last Utopia, chap. 3, and Moyn, “Imperialism, Self-
Determination, and the Rise of Human Rights,” in Iriye et al., eds., The Human 
Rights Revolution. To me, this story matters more now, since it mattered 
much more then, than the fact one can find a few in diplomatic fora such 
as the UN Commission for Human Rights who imagined a compatibility of 
the Universal Declaration’s promise with galloping nationalism. Anyway, in 
Mazzini’s tradition nationalism had generally implied protection of individual 
prerogatives from the first. Compare Liu’s essay in this dossier as well as my 
“Giuseppe Mazzini in (and Beyond) the History of Human Rights,” in Miia 
Halme-Tuomisaari and Pamela Slotte, eds., Human Rights and Other Histories 
(forthcoming). 
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remained years away. Setting itself the task of recovering lost visions 
whose percolation under empire postponed outright ideological 
victory of nationalism, this movement surely not wrong to emphasize 
the plurality of possibilities the achieved or “invented” form of 
decolonization destroyed22. In my own work I have emphasized 
that the victory of the nation-state after 1945 still allowed for highly 
creative subaltern internationalisms whose agenda from the Bandung 
Conference in the 1950s to the New International Economic Order in 
the 1970s contrasts starkly with the reign of human rights since. But 
restoring the contingency of nationalist victory even as late as World 
War II, like insisting on the plural internationalisms this victory still 
allowed, cannot interfere with two related basic points. One is that 
the 1940s were much closer to the “telos” of the era of globalized 
nationalism than to that of the era of international human rights. 
The other is that there is substantial evidence of nationalist victory 
already in the 1940s, so much so that what needs to be explained is 
not just the exciting contingency of the era but also that it was already 
beginning to be overdetermined that nationalist solidarity was soon 
to succeed so comprehensively.
Faisal Devji’s The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and the 
Temptations of Violence (Cambridge, Mass., 2012), esp. epilogue, 
emphasizes that Mohandas Gandhi was no nationalist, while 
also underlining his skepticism towards human rights. There is a 
parallel literature in Jewish studies emphasizing roads not taken 
and lost political alternatives that a statist Zionism ruled out. 
22 For the most accomplished form of this skepticism, see Todd Shepard, The 
Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France 
(Ithaca, 2006); from a longer-range perspective, see Jane Burbank and Frederick 
Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton, 2010) as well as Cooper’s essay in this dossier and Manu Goswami, 
“Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms,” American Historical 
Review 117, no. 5 (December 2012): 1461.  
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Consider three texts concerning rights from between 1945 
and 1949. The first, invoking the American Revolution’s natural 
rights, immediately adds: “In a broader sense, this now means: 
All the peoples on the earth are equal from birth, all the peoples 
have a right to live, to be happy and free.” The second claims the 
“natural right of the ... people to be masters of their own fate, like 
all other nations, in their own sovereign State.” The last begins 
“We the people,” like the American Constitution, but the rest of the 
preamble specifies that sovereignty now means socialism, and as 
a matter of fact social and economic justice is immediately listed 
– even before political justice. These are from the Declarations 
of Independence of Vietnam and Israel, respectively, and the 
Indian Constitution. (None mention “human rights,” let alone 
the Universal Declaration, and for anyone curious about how 
the Holocaust figured in rights declarations of the era, it is the 
Israeli Declaration, not the Universal Declaration, that alone 
acknowledges the Holocaust very directly, albeit with different 
consequences.) 
In many places, including all three of these, revolutionary 
nationalism required a fight along the way. And as before, in 
movements for citizenship fully compatible with violence when 
push came to shove (Mazzini, after all, had also written terrorist 
manuals) human rights in the contemporary sense were put off 
or left aside because the nation-state surged not as an affirmation 
of particularity alone but as the highly idealistic vehicle of 
cosmopolitan humanity enjoying a modular nationalism with 
no provision for superordinate constraint. The 750,000,000 
people the United Nations left colonized voted with their feet 
for a cosmopolitanism that implied their collective emancipation 
with more assurance and with more practical meaning than 
“international human rights” did. 
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*
Actually the fact is that human rights, most especially in the 
Universal Declaration, were primarily though not exclusively the 
language of the imperial powers, and these Western European lands 
were the only ones where human rights survived the ideological 
cacophony of the moment after World War II, compared to 
everywhere else in the world. (And even their publicists there did 
not normally believe that human rights portended interference in 
still widespread colonial holdings.) 
Of course, in Europe, national welfarism prevailed more than 
anywhere else. Even there (or especially there), the real debate 
in domestic politics was about how to create social freedom 
in the state. But revealingly, some early “federalist” plans for 
Europeanization did insist on the importance of human rights, 
but from a potentially unexpected quarter. Begun around the same 
time as the Universal Declaration, the European Convention’s 
negotiation extended later; and this fact meant that the fiction of 
ideological consensus about basic values prized in wartime could 
no longer be maintained even at the stage of formulating norms. 
The February 1947 communist takeover in Czechoslovakia made 
the threat elsewhere seem so vivid, and the protection of private 
property surged in importance. The internment and trial of Cardinal 
József Mindszenty, the Primate of Hungary, in 1948-1949, and 
related abuses of Christians in 
Eastern Europe like the house arrest of Czech Cardinal Josef 
Beran occurred so quickly after the Universal Declaration as to 
help define its bearing, and in fact these were the main international 
human rights abuses understood in those terms in the era23. West 
Europeans responded by making religious freedom the keystone 
23 See Andrew Martin, “Human Rights and World Affairs,” Year Book of World 
Affairs 5 (1951): 44-80.  
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of the new document. It had already been the core of the Universal 
Declaration for the Protestants and even Catholics most interested 
in its framing; now it received even more emphasis24. 
 Welfarist values may not have been so anathema to West 
Europeans, in part because they were more compatible with both 
religion and conservatism than in the United States where the 
Universal Declaration was soon denounced as “pink paper.” But 
in the origins of the Cold War the priorities within human rights 
certainly shifted and the European Convention ended up dropping 
social and economic rights. At the time, European socialists 
primarily regarded the European Convention project as a threat, 
because they understood that their conservative rivals were trying 
to internationalize the struggle over the extent of welfarism, tarring 
socialism with the brush of communist expropriation25.
If it was after World War I, in the face of unprecedented 
dangers, that what Charles Maier famously called bourgeois 
Western Europe was first “recast,” it was after World War II that it 
was re-recast, with the difference that new economic foundations 
and a transatlantic security space were linked to the ascendancy of 
the sort of Christian political parties in power that had never existed 
with the same prominence, or accepted either liberal democracy 
or supranational governance26. Only in a Western Europe in the 
era of conservative and Christian Democratic hegemony, human 
24 See my “From Communist to Muslim: Religious Freedom in European Human 
Rights Law,” South Atlantic Quarterly 113, 1 (Winter 2014): 63-86. 
25 Marco Duranti, Human Rights and Conservative Politics in Postwar Europe 
(New York, forthcoming).  
26 Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, 
Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton, 1975); Maier, 
“The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century 
Western Europe,” American Historical Review 86, 2 (March 1981): 327-52; 
Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of the European Union 
(Cambridge, 2007). 
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rights survived as an idealistic slogan from wartime, and were 
legalized on paper with supranational scope. In a comparative 
sense, this move went far beyond the fate of international human 
rights everywhere else at the time, which was that they were simply 
ignored altogether. But the European Court of Human Rights it set 
up began as a moribund institution that surprisingly took flight, along 
with international human rights generally, after the Cold War’s end. 
In an absolute sense, therefore, the legalization of supranational 
norms in the 1940s was close to meaningless, even if it laid the 
foundation for the unexpected explosion of European human rights 
in our time. The spiritual and later industrial Europeanization of the 
immediate postwar era barely conflicted with and, according to one 
historian, may even have “rescued” the European nation-state27. But 
Western Europe was most definitely the only place where the goal 
of qualifying or superseding the sovereignty of the nation-state in 
the name of human rights got anywhere. Looking back, actually, it 
is not clear if this occurred too much in the 1940s, or not enough, 
given a much later version of unified Europe’s financial and political 
crisis today. Whichever the case, the evidence is not promising 
for seeing the idea of international human rights as a successful 
European cosmopolitanism at the time to worthy of uncritical 
celebration in ours. 
*
Because there were other cosmopolitanisms than we have, 
there could also be other ones than we realize. At least until 
later events made nationalism but also socialism disfavored and 
perhaps for understandable reasons, international human rights did 
27 Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, 
Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton, 1975); Maier, 
“The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century 
Western Europe,” American Historical Review 86, 2 (March 1981): 327-52; 
Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of the European Union 
(Cambridge, 2007).  
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not fare well in the clash of cosmopolitanisms. If so, what now 
seems crucial is not any of the many alleged breakthroughs to 
“humanity” in world history or in 1948. Instead it is what happened 
since then for human rights to seem like the only viable kind of 
cosmopolitanism there is now. And so returning to 1948 primarily 
forces recognition that other cosmopolitanisms appealed then 
instead – ones we may well have lost, even as years later with the 
rise of Holocaust memory, the tragedies of decolonization, and the 
collapse of socialism a commitment to human rights that humanity 
bypassed in the 1940s became our own credo. 
I myself think that most prior cosmopolitanisms were 
discarded for good cause, but also that as a movement and an 
ethic international human rights gained their contemporary 
authority, over the past forty years alone, mainly because more 
prominent, substantial, and transformative movements lost 
prestige. As a result, it is not surprising that the ascendancy of 
human rights not in the 1940s but in our time has made them 
far less politically useful than the romantic treatments they have 
attracted in the historical literature might have led one to hope. 
Most of all, our strenuous attempt to build a myth of what the 
1940s clearly did not contribute, a global idealism of human 
rights, has made us skirt the real significance of the period, 
not simply for observers at the time but most especially from 
a present-day perspective. 
After all, the prestige of human rights and the salience of 
human rights movements in our time have coincided with the 
destruction since the 1970s of what welfarists set out to dream in 
the 1940s. It is an eerie and disturbing coincidence that no one has 
explained. In the earlier era, neoliberal intellectuals at Mont Pelerin 
and the invisible hands of businessmen’s advocacy were only 
beginning their networked campaign to band together and destroy 
289Meritum – Belo Horizonte – v. 10 – n. 2 – p. 265-291 – jul./dez. 2015
THe UniveRSal DeclaRaTion of HUman RigHTS of 1948 in THe HiSToRy of coSmopoliTaniSm
the welfarist consensus28. In the age of rights, they succeeded to a 
striking degree. In the earlier moment, the conjuncture was not yet 
imaginable in which, three decades later, what solidarity World War 
II had forged, even in places where welfarism had been defined 
against socialism, rotted in domestic settings, even as international 
politics saw the explosion in prominence of international human 
rights norms begin. The relationship between the withering of 
local, costly solidarity and the afflatus of distant, cheap solidarity 
is the main puzzle in accounting for the contemporary prominence 
of human rights, including the Universal Declaration’s belated 
prestige, and it is crucial now to solve it.
I doubt it would have made much difference if recent public 
and scholarly analysts had chosen to emphasize the national 
welfarist version of cosmopolitanism in the 1940s. But it now 
seems unfortunate that even as their politicians were dealing 
welfare states some of their final indignities, observers after the 
Cold War followed an enthusiastic public discourse in making 
international human rights not welfare states what World War II 
was fought to achieve. As for the bigger portion of the world that 
bypassed human rights in the 1940s, the period since the 1970s 
is one in which, for good and for ill, the postcolonial sovereignty 
so strenuously achieved at least in formal terms and as the object 
of perhaps the most genuinely planetary idealism in world history 
so far has been qualified – and in some places seriously so. In the 
meantime, where our ancestors in the 1940s shouldered the task of 
achieving summum bonum of the good society through the state, 
Westerners eventually learned the lessons of the Holocaust and 
28 Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement 
from the New Deal to Reagan (New York, 2009); Angus Burgin, The Great 
Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (Cambridge, Mass., 
2012); see also Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, Mass., 2011). 
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organize their moral consciousness around the summum malum of 
atrocity in war and the body in pain, especially when these seem 
to follow from someone else’s misrule. Cruelty became the worst 
thing we (or they) can do, not solidarity the best thing we can 
achieve. In Europe, Christian conservative hegemony that alone 
favored human rights in the 1940s eventually lost its hold, and 
in new circumstances human rights became at first a widespread 
transatlantic then global lexicon.
With respect to Bruno Snell or his followers in crafting a 
deep past for human rights, no classical or modern moment of 
breakthrough insight is helpful in understanding any of these rather 
recent events, though they are the ones that retrieved the Universal 
Declaration from its marginality to be the global touchstone of 
the present day. I do think those events are mostly depressing, 
but my goal is not to be deflationary, except about the Universal 
Declaration, and only to make room for the inflation of other things. 
Nostalgia for the lost welfarist ideal, of course, is not productive 
in itself, especially given its own shortcomings – many related 
to the very bordered and other exclusions that made its solidarity 
plausible to its denizens29. Neither could one sensibly oppose some 
sort of transnational solidarity. But the 1940s did not offer any 
version of it that was practically effective then or ideologically 
plausible now, and in fact a convincing transnational politics is 
something still broadly lacking – beyond the enterprises the 1940s 
gave us of conflict resolution in which the great powers matter 
most and a very particular and contestable version of regulated 
global capitalism along with efforts at humanitarian palliation in 
the face more of exigent crisis than structural deprivation30. 
29 Compare Tony R. Judt, Ill Fares the Land (New York, 2010) with Samuel Moyn, 
“Studying the Fault Lines,” Dissent 58, 2 (Spring 2011): 101-5. 
30 Consider Jean L. Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, 
Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism (Cambridge, 2012) for its critique of 
human rights millennialism but also for the absence in it of any transnational
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If national welfarism left a great deal to be desired, and there 
is no historical precedent for global welfarism, these facts do not 
redound to the benefit of an international human rights agenda that 
has generally sought nor provided either national or global welfare. 
Rather, international human rights politics originated in the 1970s 
by sticking, and perhaps defensibly, to a minimal package of norms 
like free speech and integrity of the body. The problem is that this 
occurred as the more thoroughgoing dreams for national welfare 
of the 1940s were dropped, and no agenda of global welfare has 
followed in compensation. The recent pretense by historians but also 
public figures that the 1940s gave us a more robust global vision, in 
public rhetoric and in an affirmative historiography, has gone along 
with the world historical processes that have led us not simply to 
spurn, but also to forget, the valuable features of nationalism, most 
notably a welfarist ideal that by current standards got so far. 
Since their rise as a prestigious moral and political option 
just a few decades ago, and especially since the Cold War’s end, 
international human rights movements and politics, in spite of some 
estimable contributions, have arrogated the patrimony of humanity, as 
if they were its fulfillment. In a sense, Bruno Snell had the last laugh. It 
is not so much that it is historically mistaken to accept the temptation 
to read the past – from the Greeks to the French Revolution and 
beyond – as a fund of precedents for our current political aspirations; 
my objection goes to the limited nature of the aspirations themselves. 
The past is not merely authority for the minimalist improvements the 
international human rights movement typically seeks and sometimes 
wins31. As in the biblical story of Jacob, it is always possible to resist 
an apparently inexorable lineage for the sake of a different future.
 agenda for politics other than Security Council reform and “low-intensity” 
constitutionalization beyond the state.  
31 See my “Do Human Rights Treaties Make Enough of a Difference?” in Conor 
Gearty and Costas Douzinas, eds., Cambridge Companion to Human Rights 
Law (Cambridge, 2012).

